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Complexity and Chaos in Surgical Start Times
Dennis J. Baumgardner, MD │ Message from the Editor-in-Chief
Department of Family Medicine, Aurora University of Wisconsin Medical Group, Aurora Health Care, Milwaukee, WI

In this issue of the Journal of Patient-Centered
Research and Reviews, Cox Bauer et al. provide an
elegant and interesting initial foray into the causes for
delay of first-case operating room start times.1 Among
the study’s main findings were that 88% of first-ofthe-day scheduled surgical cases were delayed, and
despite late arrival of the patient to the hospital 65%
of the time, almost 60% of delayed cases had no listed
reason for the delay. A number of potential predictor
variables were explored for inclusion in fixed-effects
logistic regression models, and key time intervals were
investigated. Further documentation and study of the
events leading up to surgical start times, along with
implementation of Plan-Do-Study-Act cycles, were
suggested to tackle this vexing problem.

dynamic systems)6 and
processes increasingly rely
on technology, which in
turn is built of interacting
components (“coupled links”)
that have become increasingly
complex.7
Thus,
health
care teams are “collections
of individual agents with
freedom to act in ways that
are not always predictable,
and whose actions are interconnected so that one agent’s
actions changes the context for other agents.”8 As nursing
informatics and administration professor Thomas Clancy
warns, “be prepared for the unexpected.”7

Certainly, one would suspect (as did the authors) that
inadequate or nonstandardized documentation may
explain the seemingly high percentage of missing listed
explanations for delay as well as the frequent mismatch
between the “late arrival” field and cause of delay. I
would submit, however, that the authors may well have
uncovered an explanation for these delays: in essence,
that there is no single or easily described reason.

One element of chaos theory that particularly portends
difficulty in reliable prediction of, say, surgical start times
in a complex dynamic system, is the so-called butterfly
effect, i.e. extreme dependence on initial conditions.2,4
This is the phenomenon in which a minor perturbation in
one location can a cause a major change downstream.4,6
Originally discovered by the meteorologist Edward
Lorenz on a supercomputer in the early 1960s,9 the
concept is that a butterfly flying in an alternative
direction can cause a major change in weather a few
days later at a location a thousand miles away.4,6

Here is where complexity science,cf.2 which has been
described as “the study of intraconnected natural
systems,”3 and chaos theory,cf.4 the study of nonlinear
dynamics, come in to play. Medical organizations
and their processes are complex, dynamic, potentially
fragile systems that often grow more complex over
time.5 Properties characterizing such iterative systems
of interacting parts include “self-organization, nonlinear
adaptation, internal diversity and distributed control.”3
Furthermore, people (themselves complex interactive
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For this subject, take a hypothetical example of a young
woman on her way to her early morning elective surgery.
A crying toddler begging her not to leave combined
with an overflowing sink delays her departure from the
house by 15 minutes. While this action prevents her
from being hit by an intoxicated driver head-on had she
left on time, the ensuing traffic back-up brings her to the
hospital’s valet parking 25 minutes later than intended.
Throw in one of the parking attendants calling in sick,
and she arrives at the hospital check-in desk 35 minutes
late. This line is momentarily stalled by a coworker
asking computer advice from the receptionist delaying
the woman’s arrival to the preoperative holding area.
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In the meantime, three patients for later surgeries have
already arrived and are being processed ahead of her,
further increasing the delay (you get the idea). This
description, of course, just deals with the patient’s
timeline to the preoperative holding area. Certainly,
shortly after arrival in the holding area, the computer
network could have gone down for several minutes, one
of the holding rooms may have been contaminated and
therefore unavailable, and multiple other problems in
this interconnected process could have arisen. Thus, a
number of problems unrelated to the patient’s modestly
late departure from home may have resulted in the
45-minutes-late start time for her particular procedure.
Indeed the patient was late, but was it possible to
pinpoint any one factor as the cause?
System complexity and its underlying science often
make it difficult to “diagnose and treat” system problems
such as delayed surgical start times. In addition, because
of another principle of chaos theory, self-similarity
on multiple scales,4 a whole systems change may be
necessary to effect change rather than a focus on a
couple of departments or processes.10 In fact, because
of interdependencies, changes in one part of the system
may have “counterintuitive consequences” on other parts.10
But all is not hopeless. Plsek and Greenhalgh have
noted, “A complex system can adapt its behavior
over time,” by not focusing completely on traditional
linear, reductionist thinking (e.g. “reduce and resolve”
approaches focused on a single department).8 Accepting
unpredictability and building more flexibility and crosscommunication into multiple interacting departments
may achieve better results.8,11 Simple things such as
cross-training and avoiding undue redundancy may well
have an impact. Use of the electronic medical record
should address the latter, for example, by maintaining
clear documentation that avoids having patients asked
the same questions by multiple persons along the way.5
Some redundancy increases patient safety; too much is
inefficient. System change is often a matter of will.
Can scientific theories or mathematical models help
solve problems such as surgical wait times? Recent use
of queueing theory simulations (of which I, admittedly,
have no knowledge or experience) in emergency
and recovery room wait times, intensive care unit
bed flow, outpatient cycle times and other health care
management issues is of interest.12-16 The advantage of
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queueing models is they are relatively simple, quick
and applicable to systems with unpredictable behavior.13
While likely better for supply-and-demand situations and
less applicable overall to complex, dynamic systems,13-16
they may nonetheless be useful to guide change in single
or closely related departments.
Perhaps selected use of such simulation models ––
combined with a whole systems approach, patient,
clinician and staff coaching, dedication, determination
and common sense –– can lead to reductions in firstcase surgical start delays.
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